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ABSTRACT
Supported decision-making has become popular among 
policymakers and mental health advocates as a means 
of reducing coercion in mental healthcare. Nevertheless, 
users of psychiatric services often seem equivocal about 
the value of supported decision-making initiatives. In this 
paper we explore why such initiatives might be rejected 
or ignored by the would-be beneficiaries, and we reflect 
on broader implications for care and coercion. We take a 
critical medical humanities approach, particularly through 
the lens of entanglement. We analyse the narratives of 
29 people diagnosed with mental illness, and 29 self-
identified carers speaking of their experiences of an 
Australian mental healthcare system and of their views 
of supported decision-making. As a scaffolding for our 
critique we consider two supported decision-making 
instruments in the 2014 Victorian Mental Health Act: the 
advance statement and the nominated person. These 
instruments presuppose that patients and carers endorse 
a particular set of relationships between the agentic self 
and illness, as well as between patient, carer and the 
healthcare system. Our participant narratives instead 
conveyed ’entangled’ relations, which we explore in 
three sections. In the first we show how ideas about 
fault and illness often coexisted, which corresponded 
with shifting views on the need for more versus less 
agency for patients. In the second section, we illustrate 
how family carers struggled to embody the supported 
decision-making ideal of the independent yet altruistic 
nominated person, and in the final section we suggest 
that both care and coercion were narrated as existing 
across informal/formal care divisions. We conclude by 
reflecting on how these dynamic relations complicate 
supported decision-making projects, and prompt a 
rethink of how care and coercion unfold in contemporary 
mental healthcare.
InTRoduCTIon
‘Care’ is a shifting, plural word when used in the con-
text of discussions of health. It suggests attention and 
compassion when articulated as a verb, but has over-
tures of regulation and control when used as a noun.1
Attending to coercion in mental healthcare 
has arguably become something of a mainstream 
pursuit. Whereas once it was conspicuously aligned 
with the antipsychiatry movement, it now publicly 
occupies an increasingly diverse array of academics, 
policymakers, clinicians and users of psychiatric 
services across the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development contexts. Much of 
the recent attention has coalesced around the intro-
duction of the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2006, and the 
supported decision-making framework it endorses.2 
Supported decision-making, often presented in 
contrast to substitute decision-making, is a frame-
work built on the premise that all citizens should 
have the same right to make choices, including 
about healthcare, regardless of ‘disabilities.’ 
Furthermore, it emphasises the obligation of mental 
health systems to provide support so that those 
who might otherwise have difficulty in, or refrain 
from, healthcare decision-making can enact their 
rights.3 This would seem to be an emancipatory 
project—transforming people previously viewed as 
mentally disabled into choosing, agentic subjects, 
and thus by extension reducing coercion in psychi-
atric care.4 Nevertheless, recent literature is equiv-
ocal about the extent to which such a reduction 
has occurred.5 Notwithstanding the argument that 
supported decision-making has only of late been 
adopted on a broader scale, and so its successes are 
yet to come (and be documented),6 several authors 
have highlighted difficulties with the implementa-
tion of supported decision-making informed mental 
healthcare. Critiques include that governments 
have failed to pay sufficient attention to the ‘posi-
tive rights’ aspect of the Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities (ie, the right to support, 
as opposed to the right to not be denied of liber-
ties7); that substitute decision-making remains prev-
alent even in systems that purport otherwise8; and 
that people diagnosed with mental illness often fail 
to use available supported decision-making tools.9
It is this seeming ambivalence of the would-be 
beneficiaries of supported decision-making projects 
that we explore further in this paper. To do so we 
use a critical medical humanities perspective, in 
particular, the idea of entanglement—the notion 
that ‘both medicine and life itself are constituted 
precisely through relations, and through practices 
of bordering, cutting and exchange through which 
those relations come to matter’.10 This follows on 
from a number of authors who have recently written 
on entanglement in this journal.11 Building on this 
work, and that of other key scholars, we hold that 
patients and carers are not neutral boundaried 
actors making linear or predictable healthcare deci-
sions. Rather they exist in, and are formed by, a set 
of intimate and often contradictory relations with 
themselves, each other, the outside world, the past 
and the anticipated future. This may include expe-
riences with healthcare services, historic models of 
illness and blame, family histories, and expectations 
of recovery. Decisions are made in dialogue with 
these relations and others, which as we will see can 
lead patients and carers on unexpected trajectories. 
For example, a mother might at once identify as 
her son’s carer and advocate, and simultaneously 
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maintain that she must make decisions on his behalf because 
mental illness has rendered him ‘incapable’.
In this example we see how care might easily assume ‘over-
tures of regulation and control’12 and how the carer becomes an 
equivocal figure who cares, but does so by restricting freedoms. 
Such fluid, seemingly incompatible, roles have recently been 
explored by a series of critical ethnographers and social scientists 
offering novel perspectives on relationships and ambivalences in 
healthcare systems.13 Annemarie Mol, for example, has written 
on how doctors and patients ‘tinker’ together, making decisions 
informed by entangled histories, social circumstances and illness 
experiences, often working outside accepted clinical protocols 
to ‘negotiate health’. Or Hennion and Vidal-Naquet14 have 
suggested that ‘constraint’ (arguably another word for coercion) 
might sometimes be incorporated into good care. In our paper 
we apply such perspectives in exploring attitudes towards, and 
enactments of, supported decision-making projects.
Supported decision-making in the Victorian Mental Health Act 
2014
In Australia, the supported decision-making model has been 
adopted in diverse settings. In the state of Victoria it became 
a guiding framework for the Mental Health Act introduced in 
2014, whose explicit aim was to provide ‘assessment and treat-
ment (…) in the least intrusive and restrictive way’.15 For the 
purposes of the analysis in this paper we have chosen to focus 
on two key supported decision-making initiatives that appeared 
with the 2014 Victorian Mental Health Act: the advance state-
ment and the nominated person. We use these as a scaffolding 
for our critique:
Advance statements provide information on preferred treatment in 
the event that a person cannot express their preferences.
A nominated person assists the patient to exercise their rights and can 
help represent the patient’s views and preferences.
We suggest that these short statements are embedded in a 
wider set of emergent discourses, logics of care and relations 
with the modern State.16 The advance statement articulates 
a person with a stable set of preferences, whose capacity for 
expressing these preferences becomes compromised during 
an ‘event’. This suggests that expressions occurring within the 
event are non-preferences. In other words, the agentic, choosing 
subject is intermittently interrupted by a ‘subjectless’ gap.
The role of the nominated person appears to be twofold. 
One is to ‘represent the patient’s views and preferences’, that is 
the authentic self, during episodes. The other role is as advo-
cate, assisting ‘the patient to exercise their rights’. The support 
person appears as an odd hybrid here—at once a relational self 
with special insight into the patient’s authentic wishes, and a 
self removed enough to take over when the patient ‘goes down’. 
Finally, implicit here is a system that requires an advocate, a 
system that, without the nominated person, would tend towards 
coercion.
We contend that for supported decision-making initiatives to 
be meaningfully deployed, the intended recipients would need to 
buy in to, and themselves enact, this ‘supported decision-making 
version’ of the world. In this paper we suggest that divisions 
between patient–carer, illness–health, legitimate–illegitimate 
preferences and system–individuals that are implicit in such a 
version are only ever partially endorsed by patients and carers. 
Furthermore, we argue that this ambivalence is crucial to under-
standing the mixed fortunes of ‘anti-coercive’ supported deci-
sion-making practices. In the process, the paper raises unsettling 
possibilities—for example that patients and carers sometimes 
desire procoercive practices, or that carers may want to leave 
rather than take over during episodes of illness, or that, intermit-
tently, patients ask for less agency. However we simultaneously 
seek to explain how, from a vantage point of entanglement, such 
disquieting possibilities might begin to make sense.
In the first section we explore how participants narrated 
illness and subjecthood, and draw out unexpected conflations 
of agency, illness and deviance. Here our analysis adds to recent 
work on the persistence of fault and blame in seemingly neutral 
models of mental illness,17 in our conjecture that blame provides 
an implicit justification for coercion or withdrawal of informal 
care.
In the second we turn our attention to the frequently valorised 
carer–cared-for relationship. We apply the idea of estrangement 
(‘The splitting away from other bodies, or the internal splitting of 
a putatively singular body – the making strange of both self and 
other’18) to understand how carer and cared-for can at once be 
‘tangled up’, and alienated or in conflict. In doing so we offer a 
disruptive critique of notions of the objective yet altruistic carer 
implicit in supported decision-making projects.
In the final section we examine the blurring of formal and 
informal care practices. We challenge the commonly held idea 
that coercion is confined to formal psychiatric systems, paying 
attention both to self-coercion and carer-enacted coercion, but 
also to how care is sought in the unlikely setting of a psychiatric 
ward.
THE STudY
The findings in this paper are drawn from a large interdisci-
plinary research project exploring experiences of people in the 
mental health system, including in relation to supported deci-
sion-making. In this paper, we focus on the narratives of 29 
people diagnosed with mental illness and of 29 non-linked people 
supporting diagnosed family members. All had encountered the 
mental healthcare system in Victoria, Australia. Participants 
were recruited via advertising through mental health community 
support services, newsletters and online advertising. Participants’ 
diagnoses were self-reported (and were most frequently bipolar 
disorder and schizophrenia). Many had experienced involuntary 
treatment. All participants provided informed, written consent 
to be involved in the interview and self-identified as being able 
to fully participate.
The second author led the study’s interdisciplinary research 
team, and the fourth author was a member of the project advi-
sory group. The first author is a psychiatrist who has previously 
worked in the Victorian healthcare system. Interviews were 
conducted by non-clinical qualitative researchers employed on 
the study under the supervision of the second author. In the first 
section participants were asked to provide an account of their 
experiences of being diagnosed and living with a mental illness, 
or of supporting a diagnosed family member. In the second 
section participants were prompted to speak about a range of 
research-related themes. Themes included diagnosis, hospi-
talisation, involuntary and voluntary treatments, experiences 
of making decisions about treatment, or supporting others to 
make decisions and ideas about recovery. The combination of 
an unstructured ‘your story’ component and a clarifying section 
allowed us to identify congruities and divergences in how 
concepts such as self, agency and illness appeared in different 
contexts.19
Interviews lasted 1–2 hours and were conducted at locations 
convenient for the participants. They were video-recorded or 
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audio-recorded with written informed consent, transcribed 
verbatim, and returned to the participants for review. Impor-
tantly, participants could opt to delete sections, which meant 
that the materials analysed were participant-approved tran-
scripts. Transcripts were subsequently de-identified.
Of note, of the 29 patient participants only 2 people disclosed 
having made an advance statement and only 2 said they had a 
nominated person. In the carer arm of the study, one person 
believed their cared-for was thinking about making an advance 
statement, and one said that the cared-for had a nominated 
person.
Patient and public involvement
The study was supported by an advisory group which included 
people who had received a psychiatric diagnosis and family 
carers. The advisory group met on a regular basis for the dura-
tion of the study and provided input into the overall project 
from its design to data analysis. At the end of the study, the advi-
sory group contributed to the translation of research findings 
into two digital resources aimed at providing information and 
support to people who have received a psychiatric diagnosis, 
family carers, educators, policymakers, and health and social 
care providers.
Analysis
Our study falls under the umbrella of narrative enquiry, but is 
indebted to both narrative and thematic analysis techniques. We 
took ‘a dialogic approach that advocates an address to content, 
alongside structure and context’20 in order to draw out narra-
tive nuances, while simultaneously capturing a sense of themes 
occurring across multiple transcripts. To highlight this approach, 
we present our findings as a combination of collated themes 
and exemplary vignettes. We also revisit excerpts from a small 
number of participants throughout the paper to show how seem-
ingly incompatible plotlines (eg, illness histories and stories of 
deviance) and characterisations (eg, sick vs irresponsible protag-
onists) became entangled. Of note this is but one of a series of 
papers we hope to publish from this study—it should function as 
an introduction to the complexity of themes relating to care and 
coercion. Elsewhere we will present a more detailed narrative 
study of selected accounts.
Transcripts were analysed in a series of iterative steps. Initially 
they were read closely by the first two authors, discussed broadly 
and emergent themes noted. Subsequently these two authors 
conducted a genre-traversing literature review, returned to the 
transcripts, and watched corresponding videos or listened to 
audio recordings. Finally overarching themes were generated 
and illustrative quotes selected to create a first draft of the paper. 
The third and fourth authors joined the writing process, contrib-
uting to structure, narrative analysis and the identification of 
relevant literature.
In interpreting the narrative data we combined an interest 
in entanglement21 and ‘hauntological relations’ (after Karan 
Barad22—the idea that what is ‘now’ and ‘here’ are continually 
disrupted by what is/was ‘there’ and ‘then’) with related atten-
tion to how discourses shaped (haunted) participant narratives.23 
Although our use of video and audio material provided the back-
drop to some of the analysis, and hints of the affective reverbera-
tions in the research process, we have not included them as ‘data’ 
in this paper. This, combined with the fact that the authors did 
not conduct the interviews themselves, means that we offer few 
reflections on entangled research processes. Thus we do not seri-
ously broach co-construction of narratives between researcher 
and interviewee, affective/discursive/material entanglements, or 
reflections on how our own professional histories transform/
are transformed by encounters with ‘data’. Again, we intend to 
address these aspects elsewhere.
Theoretical considerations and a note on terminology
We reflected at length on how to describe our participants. Ulti-
mately, we decided to use ‘neutral’ terms such as participant 
where appropriate, but to apply terms such as carer, cared-for 
and patient in circumstances where this was the dominant 
narrative positioning we could discern (eg, where participants 
described themselves or the protagonists in their narratives as 
carers/patients). Nevertheless, a key intention is to simultane-
ously reveal how such terms structure experience and how expe-
rience destabilises these terms (eg, the carer who is absent during 
illness episodes).
Our use of care and coercion is deliberately ambiguous. Care 
we conceive of interchangeably as the acts of a designated carer, 
as being in relation24 and as being concerned about or preoccu-
pied by something.25 Coercion we consider by degrees, drawing 
on recent theorising about how diverse attempts to influence 
an other (or oneself) can be conceptualised on the ‘coercion 
spectrum’. This is a spectrum that encompasses ‘persuasion’26 
and ‘nudging’27 alongside more widely recognised forms of 
psychiatric coercion. We do not offer a new dogmatically plural 
understanding of these concepts or seek to relativise the excesses 
of restraint and control on psychiatric wards. Rather we hope 
to engender novel ways of ‘thinking through’ what counts as 
care and coercion, and to ask how such reclassification would 
complicate seemingly neutral or unambiguous relations.
SuSPEndEd SElVES oR wIllEd IllnESS?
We begin our analysis by exploring how participant narratives 
corroborated or contradicted the self–illness split underpinning 
the advance statement. We have devoted a section to this for two 
reasons. First, the anticoercive function of the advance statement 
is of course precarious. It operates not by avoiding all coercion, 
but by accepting that upholding a ‘well’ person’s preferences 
will likely entail going against their wishes during ‘episodes’. It 
is only if we accept that the wishes during such episodes are 
spurious, mere symptoms, that the advance statement can indeed 
be anticoercive.28 Furthermore, in Australia, as elsewhere, 
emphasising the split between illness and person is often used to 
counter beliefs about deviance.29 Moreover, the split is invoked 
to advocate for care as opposed to coercion for those diagnosed 
with mental illness, by asserting that mental illness is like any 
other and is not the diagnosed person’s fault.30 This of course 
compels the question—how would these arguments change if the 
person were seen not to be separate from their illness, to have 
some control over what happens during ‘episodes’? And how 
might this unsettle the conversation about choice, freedom, care 
and coercion?
not at fault for being sick but responsible for staying well
In our narratives the self–illness split was superficially endorsed 
by many participants. For example, Brittany emphasised that 
those diagnosed with mental illness have “something wrong” as 
opposed to are “crazy.”
People with experience of [mental illness] think well why is this hap-
pening to me? (…) They feel like they’re going crazy where you’re 
not going crazy. You actually have got something wrong with you. 
(Brittany)
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Alejandra also clearly distinguished between personhood and 
illness:
It’s very hard to realise that you’ve actually had episodes of being 
unwell where you’ve done things and behaved in certain ways and 
smelt things and heard things which are all not real (…) But I think 
once you come to terms with it and try and realise that it’s not your 
fault, that it is your illness you know you do feel quite a bit better 
about it. (Alejandra)
However in repeated readings of the transcripts we noticed 
that the explicit narrative position, often emphatically conveyed 
as can be seen above, could conceal moments of ‘narrative doubt’ 
or hidden meanings. Models of illness and selfhood, agency and 
fault were thus more complicated than they initially seemed. 
The narrative blurring of self and illness occurred in many ways. 
One subtle contradiction was that while many participants, like 
Alejandra, emphasised that people could not be blamed for their 
illness, the participants simultaneously felt it was their responsi-
bility to ‘stay well’:
I guess I’m lucky that the medication works and I can have normal 
thoughts and I don’t have any episodes.
But that’s not saying I might not in the future (…) I have to monitor 
my stress level to make sure that, you know, I adjust my life accord-
ingly and don’t get into situations where, you know, I feel like things 
are out of control again. (Alejandra)
This extract begins in the tenor of Alejandra’s previous one, 
referencing ‘luck’, and thus implying that illness and self are 
independent entities, randomly connected. However, after a 
pause Alejandra introduces the idea that she does have some 
responsibility for her illness, paradoxically intimating that were 
she to relapse, she could not be deemed to be entirely faultless.
on preferring to remain ill: accounts of agency during illness 
episodes
In our narratives ‘ill’ protagonists were not, as we had expected, 
always depicted as hapless figures afflicted by a narratively 
demarcated illness. Rather symptoms often became absorbed 
into the character of the protagonist and temporal delineations 
between ‘healthy’ and ‘ill’ difficult to discern. This process 
can be seen in a section of Wendy’s (carer) account, where she 
described how her son had deceived his doctor during an illness 
episode and thus avoided necessary hospitalisation:
Wendy: S might have been putting on a good show to the doctor, 
which they can do. They can act quite normal and responsible and 
convince you of what they can do and can’t do and it’s not the truth.
Interviewer: Do you think at that time, they are making an effort to 
behave in that way? Or are they actually just well?
Wendy: Oh they do, no, no they – they know what goes on, they 
learn from the others, what goes on, how you should behave. And if 
you get the right people there, that you can pull the wool over their 
eyes, you’re right. So he did, he was lucky that day, or unlucky for us.
This vignette shows what we might call an entangled, or 
‘mixed-up’, illness model. Wendy clearly in part endorses a 
biomedical frame for understanding S’s problem; she asserts that 
S is not “well” and that his rightful place during an episode is in 
hospital. Nevertheless, she also imputes qualities of an agentic 
subject—evoking a character who despite being ill can plan and 
organise and wilfully deceive. Furthermore, she disrupts the 
temporal and spatial delineations characteristic of a biomedical 
model. When she discusses how “they know what goes on, they 
learn from the others,” we get the impression that S has planned 
his behaviour and has associated with ‘other patients’ before the 
‘episode’ and when not in hospital. Ultimately, we are left uncer-
tain whether he is ever well, or in fact, given that his capacity to 
learn from ‘them’ and implement ‘their’ techniques seems unin-
terrupted, whether he is ever unwell.
At fault after all
This narrative ambiguity around illness episodes versus (implic-
itly deviant) agency was surprisingly common. Several partici-
pants, in both arms of the study, spoke of how cared-fors or they 
themselves had lied, performed or deceived during ‘episodes’. 
Furthermore, as can be seen with Wendy, although most partic-
ipants ‘officially’ endorsed a biomedical temporality of healthy 
self—illness episode—healthy self, many narratives failed to 
clearly punctuate these transitions. A notable corollary was 
uncertainty around whether decisions made when ‘unwell’ were 
irrational or irresponsible:
You make decisions and you take the responsibility too, but this men-
tal illness, they make irrational decisions. They do not take responsi-
bility (…) and they get away with it (…). (Hannah, carer)
Hannah’s emphasis here on “getting away with it” suggests 
that those with “mental illness” are capable of acting other-
wise, indeed that they choose their actions according to antic-
ipated benefits. Penny, a carer of an adult son with a diagnosis 
of psychosis, was similarly preoccupied with how her son’s 
irresponsibility had led to his current episode of illness and to 
hospitalisation:
We try to focus on the fact that we’ve got to care for ourselves and, 
and J now has to take more responsibility. We’re not there to pick up 
the pieces all the time, he’s not a little boy anymore, he’s an adult. 
(Penny, carer)
These narratives provide a somewhat foreboding response to 
Alejandra’s concern at the beginning of this section that if she 
did not look after herself, she could be held responsible. They 
seem to suggest that you can and will be held to account for not 
doing more to prevent an episode. The denouement to Hannah’s 
care narrative, in which she described why she no longer felt 
guilty about not being there in the period preceding the suicide 
of her stepdaughter, T, perhaps illustrates this most starkly. 
In one section of the narrative Hannah conveys that T was ill 
before she died:
Actually the last time when I saw her, when she went crazy last year, 
she was at the front door, she was carrying on, she was crazy (…).
But then elsewhere Hannah emphasises:
I will not take it on board sort of feeling guilty about it, or sad about 
it anymore. It was her choice at the end of the day, I feel, you and 
only you can make decisions in your life and choices. So it is your 
responsibility. (Hannah, carer)
These narratives reveal some of the difficulties with the 
supported decision-making model of a subject with ‘legitimate’ 
preferences interrupted by illness. The participants in our study 
clearly employed polyvalent, fluid models to understand how 
‘episodes’ emerged. Illegitimate preferences were therefore not 
just seen as manifestations of an illness episode, as suggested by 
the supported decision-making model, but for many seemed to 
have caused the episode.31
Our paper thus adds to the literature on how medical models 
can coexist with, indeed co-constitute, seemingly anachronous 
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models of blame.32 Significantly, our findings build on this work 
by emphasising that it is not just that those diagnosed with mental 
illness continue to blame themselves, or that family members 
continue to experience blame, but that blame moves between 
people, and that, sometimes at least, carers blame the cared-for. 
In terms of entanglement they reveal the uncertainty our partic-
ipants expressed about what was ‘normal’ and what was ill—the 
mingling of ‘behaviours’ and ‘symptoms’, choice and arbitrary 
hand of fate. But also to entanglements in the hauntology sense 
of the word—the idea that beliefs about deviance do not just 
‘live in the past’ but ‘flash up’ in the present.33 That they haunt 
because they are not allowed to be said,34 must be couched in 
the available blameless language. Thus, Brittany and Alejandra 
can emphatically declare that “it’s not your fault” or “you’re 
not going crazy” and in doing so ‘flash up’ the possibility that 
it could have been your fault or that you might have been going 
crazy. And Hannah can appear to be lauding choice and agency, 
and simultaneously be telling the unsettling story of how her 
cared-for had been alone in the period before she ended her life.
Finally then, this section has itself begun to say something 
that ought not to be said—that in the carer–cared-for relation-
ship blame, alienation and ‘stepping back’ can exist alongside, 
or even supersede, altruism, advocacy and ‘taking over’. We 
now address these themes more concertedly, tracking how the 
carers and cared-fors in our narratives were both entangled and 
estranged.
wHoSE PREfEREnCES?
But the wider issue for all of us is how to rethink the modernist 
assumption that the embodied subject is autonomous and 
distinct from her others, and contained by the boundaries of her 
own body.35
There have been very few people in A’s life that have actually listened 
to me and supported me. (Erin, carer)
Illness in relational context
In our introduction we suggested that the supported deci-
sion-making model presupposes the presence, and involve-
ment, of an empathic, ‘in-tune’, but ultimately boundaried and 
‘sensible’ carer. In our interviews, some carers did offer narra-
tives consistent with an advocacy and ‘back-up self ’ model of 
support.
However, in other narratives the premises of the supported 
decision-making model, and much of the broader literature on 
carer involvement in mental healthcare, were destabilised. In the 
literature there is an increasing focus on the difficulties faced 
by informal carers,36 but such difficulties tend to be perceived 
as resulting from the destructive force of a biomedical illness 
arriving in an otherwise intact family. For example:
Illness creates a need for increased competence in coping with prob-
lems or maneuvering in health services and adds challenges in main-
taining interconnectedness and relationships among family mem-
bers.37
There are of course compelling historic reasons to focus on 
aberrant neurotransmitter pathways and genes, as opposed to 
aberrant families, when considering why it is troublesome to 
care for someone with a psychiatric diagnosis. But as Callard et 
al38 in their discussion of schizophrenia note, the ‘fear of giving 
any energy to discredited models of family blaming’ can limit ‘the 
kinds of conversations it is possible to have about Schizophrenia.’ 
In our study the conversations participants engaged in about 
schizophrenia (or other mental illnesses) were complex. Impor-
tantly, just as descriptions of illness episodes were not ‘emptied 
of subjects’, they were not relationally neutral.
Penny, for example, whose narrative we introduced in the first 
section, in this excerpt justifies why she needed to “step back” 
from caring:
It has made me feel a little bit more comfortable in the terms that 
we’re taking a step back and giving it, the responsibility, to him. He’s 
the one that has to do the hard work and we’re just hoping that it – 
see, nothing else worked, all the love and the support and the, you 
know, and being there and taking, you know, frozen dinners to him 
[laughs] (…). (Penny, carer)
In this excerpt Penny expands on why she believes her son 
should ‘take more responsibility’. Notably there is a profound 
sense of disappointment that Penny’s care was not enough, that 
she was doing the “hard work” and this work was not recipro-
cated. J’s illness therefore is not a neutral collection of symp-
toms, but rather, in its very existence, speaks to Penny about who 
she is and what she as mother and carer has or has not achieved.
Caring in an outcome-oriented world
This vignette shows how accounts of illness became tangled up 
with stories of relationships. However, it also destabilises the idea 
of ‘pure’ carer–cared-for relations. Penny provides a compelling 
account of what it feels like to be a maternal carer whose son 
refuses to get well. Her narrative disrupts ideas implicit in the 
supported decision-making imaginary39 of the carer as altruistic, 
self-displacing, relationship-suspending advocate, a figure quar-
antined from the vagaries of an outcome-oriented world. Instead 
Penny’s account points to how that outcome-oriented world can 
interrupt, estrange, co-constitute the carer–cared-for relation-
ship. This manifests in different ways. Several carers (usually 
parents) mentioned how promising the lives of their cared-fors 
had seemed ‘before illness’. But participant narratives differed in 
how they narratively resolved, or, importantly, failed to resolve, 
such ‘lost futures’.40 In accounts such as Penny’s and Hannah’s, 
there was a sense that the cared-for had not fulfilled their part 
of the ‘care contract’. Both participants emphasised how much 
they had done for their children and how bright their future 
could have been:
I’d say the world wasn’t big enough for her, for the plans that I had 
for her (…). (Hannah, carer)
And both seemed to, implicitly at least, blame the cared-for, 
not just for ‘becoming ill’, but for doing so despite—in spite of—
their caring attentions. Penny reinforced this idea by describing 
the ‘successful’ trajectories of her two other children, whose 
repeated reassurances that “it’s not us that have caused (J’s 
illness),” and entreaties to stop ‘caring so much’ for J, provided a 
narrative backdrop to J’s episodes. Far from supporting popular 
notions of carer–cared-for attunement, these narratives seemed 
to present an ‘imperative estrangement (…) powerfully articu-
lated as the denial of loss’41 (of the hoped-for, self-extending 
successful child).
Carers versus cared-fors?
Other narratives also hinted at the permeability of boundaries 
between the carer–cared-for dyad and the ‘outside world’. 
Surprisingly, several carer participants framed their personal 
struggles with references to an inherent, seemingly inevitable, 
conflict between carers and ‘the mentally ill’:
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[mental health care systems] don’t take the side of the victim. They 
take the side of the perpetrator (…) The person who’s mentally ill is 
the perpetrator. (Amelia, carer)
For these participants, the carer–cared-for dyad was located 
within a broader system of constitutive (and conflictual) rela-
tions, a theme that is also beginning to be explored elsewhere in 
the literature on informal care.42
Remarkably though the narratives in our study were not of 
radical separation. They were narrated by participants who 
continued to identify as carers. This paradox is illustrated well 
by Amelia, when she continues:
And where does the law go? With the perpetrator. That’s how it feels 
at times, you know. And your only intent is to help, help the person 
you love.
Thus Amelia, Penny and Hannah describe estrangement 
but from a starting point of entanglement. In their narratives 
we see attempts to distance themselves, to not feel guilty, to 
defend against ‘a perpetrator’, but these are the narrative allies 
of love (Amelia), adoration (Hannah) and delivering frozen 
dinners (Penny). We get the sense that such manoeuvres are 
an endeavour to ‘border, cut and exchange’43 in a relationship 
where the beginning and end of carer and cared-for are hard to 
distinguish. Narratively we see this in the merging of carer and 
cared-for fortunes: for example in Penny and Hannah’s preoc-
cupation with the failure of their caring endeavours to prevent 
the cared-for’s illness, or in Erin’s blurring of protagonists in the 
quote opening this section (‘There have been very few people in 
A’s life that have actually listened to me and supported me”).
Too close to care?
Interestingly even among the participants who narrated a more 
expected narrative configuration of the altruistic carer and 
care-requiring cared-for, there were some who felt that the 
carers were ‘too close’ to act as effective advocates in mental 
healthcare systems:
And some of that is my fault, I suppose. Should I have pushed, should 
I have dragged him off to places, should I - but you couldn’t do that, 
he just absolutely refused (…) I was afraid that I would lose him 
altogether. (Larissa, carer)
Not only because he’s a professional but because he knows me and 
I don’t feel like, you know, for example my mum would be able to 
separate that emotional side. (Donna)
I am unwilling – even though I know he should have that informa-
tion – I am unwilling to have that discussion with the doctor, because 
if he tells my son that I’ve told him that, my son won’t allow me in. 
(Natalia, carer)
In such narratives the contradictory expectations on informal 
carers within the supported decision-making logic became 
apparent. Implicit in supported decision-making projects seems 
to be the idea that carers will act as reservoirs of intimacy and 
authentic knowledge, but also that these reservoirs will function 
as resources for the formal psychiatric system.44 This is exempli-
fied in an ancillary Victorian government website detailing the 
role and importance of mental health carers: ‘families and carers 
often have knowledge that is essential information for clinicians 
in their assessment’.45
It is assumed that informal carers will ‘report back’; iden-
tify warning signs and ‘relapse signatures’; extend the gaze of 
clinicians. Furthermore, in their admission that they are too 
emotional, worried about losing their sons or not being ‘allowed 
in’, these participants, paradoxically, seem to be conceding a 
caring failure: “even though I know he should have that infor-
mation”; “and some of that is my fault I suppose.” This reminds 
us of Shildrick and Steinberg’s observation that ‘estrangement 
can be both the effect of, and resistance to, governance’.46 Larissa 
and Nathalia perceive themselves (or are perceived by others) as 
deficient (strange) carers because their caring activities, at least 
at times, occur in opposition to formal psychiatric systems. As 
Donna’s excerpt suggests, they fail as capital c Carers because 
they care too much. Thus as they attempt to ‘return’ to some 
form of authentic or intimate caring, they narrate themselves as 
deviant.
THE SYSTEM IS EVERYwHERE, BuT noT wHERE I nEEd IT
Such analysis suggests that the ‘uncaring’ excerpts we have used 
in this paper may not be as aberrant as they seem. What if there 
is an element of uncaring, of distance, of conflict built into the 
figure of the informal carer? In this final section we explore the 
idea of the informal carer who, in caring, enacts coercive func-
tions. However, in keeping with the idea of entanglements, of 
porous boundaries between system, carer and cared-for, we go 
on to suggest that ‘familial style’ care is conversely sometimes 
sought in formal psychiatric services.
Informal carers and coercion in formalised care
In several of our narratives there were descriptions of psychi-
atric wards in which patients and carers felt disempowered and 
unable to influence the course of treatment. A graphic example 
was Geraldine’s account of her experiences in seclusion:
I was in seclusion and I was in there for days. And in between that 
I, there were parts where I was brought out and strapped to a bed. 
But I was really - they had to use security a few times to hold me 
down to put – to give me a needle and I just had bruises all over me. 
(Geraldine)
That the mental healthcare system depicted here tends towards 
coercion and disempowerment is evident. However, Geraldine’s 
narrative was also notable for the role informal carers had in 
relation to the system. Geraldine felt that her ‘support people’ 
were instrumental in getting her admitted to hospital and in 
keeping her on the ward for a longer period:
I was never allowed to know what they had been saying to the doc-
tors either and they continued to report on me. So eventually I was 
allowed on days out in [city] and I only had two girlfriends to go out 
with and they were taking me out and then ringing and reporting to 
the doctor.
Of note here is the way in which informal (and apparently 
self-anointed) carers and the hospital staff are seen to interact, in 
fact almost conspire, to remove the rights of the person who has 
been diagnosed with mental illness.
Coercion at home
In other narratives coercion appeared in concealed ways. A 
noteworthy example was in Ben’s account. Ben described an 
all-consuming caring role for his wife and advocacy against a 
disempowering mental health system. He gave a lengthy account 
of how his wife’s confusion on a locked psychiatric ward had 
been misdiagnosed as psychosis, when he, as long-time husband 
and carer, knew that it must be related to her periodic bouts 
of constipation. He detailed how after days of presenting this 
information but not being heard, and his wife’s condition wors-
ening, he smuggled in laxatives and the problem was solved in a 
dramatic and, for the hitherto disbelieving nurses, rather messy 
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way. Ben followed up this anecdote by asserting that his wife 
would never again be admitted to a psychiatric ward. In the 
dominant narrative arc, then, there was a portrayal of a self-sac-
rificing, attuned carer, with concerted and apparently faultless 
advocacy against a powerful system. Yet what became apparent 
through the course of the interview was that his solution to a 
locked psychiatric ward was not an eschewal of the healthcare 
system, but a transplantation of that system into the home:
I printed off from the internet a bowel movement chart and copied it 
and laminated it and put it in with a felt pen in the toilet, so that she 
can make a mark every time that she’d actually had a bowel motion.
When they want to change the dosage, even by a few milligrams, it’s 
like, I don’t know, just ask him (Ben). Because I have to keep a total 
track on what’s going on and when they’re going to play around and 
it’s like I’m half doctor, half psychiatrist and another half of me – 
yeah, that’s three halves – is a pharmacist.
And although this project was described as an altruistic 
endeavour, sometimes there were unsettling aspects to the narra-
tive. Ben’s response, for example, when asked whether his wife 
had an advance statement was:
My wife’s advanced statement is me, “ask him” [laughs]. Yeah, it’s 
simple as that, because unless I tick the box, it ain’t going to happen.
And in his description of daily life:
And you can twist it too. I love it when I say, “Hey, don’t forget, you 
just said you were going to go and make your coffee” and she hadn’t 
at all, but, “Oh, did I? Sorry.” Up she gets, goes and makes a coffee. 
I can do it all day long, I don’t have to get up and make one coffee.
In these excerpts Ben’s wife is not physically located in 
a psychiatric ward, but we wonder whether she is free of the 
mental health system, or indeed of coercion. As we have reflected 
before,47 care here ‘takes on an odd face indeed’, a face, more-
over, that remains largely obscured in the literature on mental 
health and informal care.
This vignette powerfully illustrates how the system and its 
coercive practices are not confined to formal psychiatric wards. 
Indeed traces of coercion were found in divergent narrative 
settings and on unlikely protagonists. For example, in the patient 
arm of the study there were a number of ‘consumer consultants’ 
or ‘peer workers’ who volunteered to be interviewed. In these 
interviews, the narrative voice frequently shifted between that 
of ‘lived experience narrator’ (someone with their own experi-
ence of mental illness) and that of ‘expert informant’ (someone 
narrating as a mental health system employee), the latter position 
often appearing to be more comfortable. In expert mode, advice, 
or even admonitions, became an integral part of the narrative 
performance. This is demonstrated well in this section of text 
where Alexis promotes the benefits of psychotropic medication:
People think once they’re on medication and they get better (…) they 
think that they’re better automatically. They think they should stop 
their medication. But they don’t realise it’s the medication’s made 
them better. (…) That medication, if it makes him well, it should be 
respected.
Alexis’ narrative reveals slippages between the categories of 
patient and professional, and shows how ‘soft forms of coer-
cion’48 could be enacted by people diagnosed with psychiatric 
disorders, both on themselves and others.
familial care in the psychiatric clinic
Interestingly, Alexis elsewhere described a close relationship to 
his doctor:
The one that I’m having now I’ve had for maybe 20 years or more. 
He’s a friend of mine, a good friend of mine now, rather than a prac-
titioner (…) Calls me his best patient, isn’t that cute?
The depiction of psychiatrist or case worker as friend or 
paternal/maternal figure was not unusual. Furthermore, several 
participants expressed the view that they could be ‘more open’ 
with clinicians or support workers than with family when making 
decisions about treatment.
These narratives thus challenged conceptualisations of the 
family as inherently in-tune and better at knowing what a 
cared-for might want. They resonate with other literature docu-
menting how relationships with professionals can sometimes 
take on familial forms and become a reservoir for feelings and 
modes of relating that are unable to be accommodated in the 
nuclear family.49 In our study this relating to clinicians as though 
they were family was extended further. Many seemed to feel that 
patients ultimately belonged in hospitals:
I feel that carers won’t be hanging around to care if they’re unable to 
liaise in a productive manner with the medical staff, because they’ll 
be throwing their hands up in the air going okay, well you want to 
deal with it, you don’t want me to be involved, you have it all then. 
I’m trying to help you in your job and have this person at home and 
not in the hospital system. (Rachel, carer)
“They are probably going to send him home, Friday.” I said, “Well, 
in that case, you better tell him, ‘Don’t come home, because I will 
change the locks.’ (…) Tell the psychiatrist, ‘Take him home to his 
house with a new baby and see how he copes.’” (Amelia, carer)
(On being asked about the changes to the Mental Health Act) That 
is just a buck-passing invention to pass some of the responsibility 
or more of the responsibility off the mental health system, onto the 
carer. (Micheala, carer)
These excerpts show that for many carers ‘the system’ was not 
perceived as a service provider to be called on in times of crisis 
or in an advisory capacity. Rather the system was seen as having 
shared or even primary responsibility for those diagnosed with 
mental illness, and carers were constructed as the ones ‘helping 
out’. Here then a resistance to the ‘responsibilisation’ of informal 
carers50 becomes apparent as biomedical narratives are used to 
‘return’ patients to their ‘proper place’. Entanglements become 
not just about the flow of the exterior into the interior, the 
psychiatric system into the intimate, but also about its obverse—
the movement of familial responsibility into psychiatric services, 
the demand that the psychiatrist take the patient home, that 
mental health systems stop “buck-passing” onto carers.
Furthermore, significantly, it is not clear in these narratives 
whether the carers are requesting more care or more coercion 
(ie, longer periods in involuntary treatment) or both. In part 
this speaks to the already addressed theme of conflict between 
carers and cared-fors, to the disruptive possibility that to care 
for carers, there ‘needs’ to be more coercion in mental health 
systems. However, it also returns us to our starting premise that 
‘care is a shifting, plural word’51 and to the even more disrup-
tive possibility that care is necessarily entangled with coercion. 
Importantly this idea was not just conveyed in the carer arm of 
the study, but was also implied by several patient participants. 
Often the absence of ‘minor coercive tactics’ was construed as 
something of an abandonment or lack of care. This was illus-
trated by Dorothy when discussing how her children should 
have been more assertive in ‘getting her help’:
They kept on saying, Mum, the only person that can help you is 
you. And, yes, in a way that is true, but in another way, no, you need 
somebody to give you a kick up the pants. (Dorothy)
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Or by Justin when he compared two different clinicians 
and maintained that the “bad one,” who had gone along with 
everything he said, “didn’t care”:
If you don’t care about them enough to dispute something with them, 
then you’re not doing your job. (Justin)
Such accounts demand a shift in how we think about the inter-
section of care and coercion in mental healthcare systems and 
further trouble the idea of the boundaried, self-knowing subject 
who generates preferences independently of the relational 
context.
CoERCIon BY oMISSIon And oTHER ConCluSIonS
In this paper we have introduced a framework for understanding 
the contradictions inherent in contemporary supported deci-
sion-making projects. Our analysis has revealed how a supported 
decision-making version of illness, patient, carer and system at 
times structured our participant narratives, but that this struc-
ture simultaneously obscured more complex, ambiguous and 
fluid relational dynamics. Notable was the way in which suppos-
edly outdated models of blame slipped into, and were narratively 
accommodated in, ‘blameless’ narrative trajectories.
That such paradigm slippages have a material impact on 
supported decision-making enactments was endorsed by our 
narratives. Thus many of the patient participants were able 
to describe the potential benefits of advance statements, but 
admitted to not having one themselves. As Abigail ‘explained’:
This might sound - I don’t - I - I’m - yeah, I haven’t - I don’t plan on 
becoming really unwell again [laughs].
The failure to make advance statements is illogical if we assume 
that those diagnosed with mental illness are rational actors with 
intermittent biochemically induced suspensions of reason. But if 
instead we believe that illness episodes are moral failings, indic-
ative of insufficient effort to recover,52 then advance statements 
present an impossible bind—at once denoting the rational, 
self-monitoring, hazard-averting citizen, and introducing the 
possibility that her efforts will not be good enough.
Similarly, if we consider the informal carer not as inherently 
altruistic, with ‘authentic’ knowledge of the cared-for, but 
rather as someone who has been called into being by psychiatric 
systems, then the advocacy project becomes a formidable, often 
unrealisable undertaking. This too was borne out in our study. 
Whether in Geraldine’s account of the friends who rather than 
shortening her hospital stay, prolonged it, or in Ben’s description 
of substitute decision-making, or in Larissa, Donna and Natalia’s 
stories of carers becoming ‘too emotional’ to effectively advo-
cate. Perhaps most startling were the descriptions of carers who 
simply were not there when an ‘episode’ was occurring. If we 
consider the complex relations conveyed in our narratives, the 
mingling of self-blame and projected blame, the unbearable close-
ness of a cared-for who cannot be cared into wellness, such ‘step-
ping back’ perhaps represents the embodiment of a ‘broken care 
narrative’ (a narrative that is seemingly derailed or disrupted53). 
This idea of unbearable closeness adds to, hopefully productively 
disrupts, the existing body of literature on carer involvement in 
supported decision-making. It suggests that if we are to speak of 
relational selves,54 or ‘intimate’ knowledge and affect flowing 
between carer and cared-for, then we must also take seriously 
how the intimate is in constitutive relations with ‘the outside,’ 
and how blame, guilt and anger also flow. Furthermore, these 
flows are not just thought or felt, but are enacted in ways that, 
as we have seen, complicate supported decision-making projects.
Surprising too were the participants, in both arms of the 
study, who, when asked about supported decision-making, 
responded not with accounts of explicit coercion, but with 
narratives of abandonment, lack of care or even a desire for more 
coercion. This is not to say that coercive practices no longer 
exist on psychiatric wards, or that supported decision-making 
projects are redundant. Indeed, our own narratives revealed 
the persistence of ‘traditional’ forms of coercion. But rather it 
is to reassert that in rationalised healthcare systems traditional 
ways of coercing exist as part of a larger, distributed, network 
of governance, of self-sanctioning, or of carer and peer worker 
regulation. Moreover, we contend that ‘formal’ coercive prac-
tices on psychiatric wards, with their unwieldiness, costliness 
and their visually perceptible affront to humanist ideals, are not 
the system’s preferred form of coercion. And so for many of our 
participants their experiences of mental health systems were as 
much about being told to go away, as being deprived of liberties. 
That this experience of mental healthcare shaped responses to 
the supported decision-making project was evident. Thus, as we 
have seen, there was a deep scepticism among some participants, 
a belief that there were hidden motives behind supported deci-
sion-making initiatives, that they were part of a mental health 
architecture seeking to ‘offload care’. And for others we had the 
sense that we were asking the wrong questions; that supported 
decision-making was an interesting theoretical exercise; but that 
having agency in making decisions was not their biggest concern; 
that what worried them most was “not that others boss you 
about, but that nobody cares.”55
Hence our findings are located within a growing body of 
work critiquing the ideals of the choosing, self-realising patient 
and healthcare systems where ‘choice’ (or preferences) is para-
mount.56 Furthermore they prompt questions we believe have 
yet to be concertedly addressed. Why has supported deci-
sion-making become so popular at a time when the number of 
involuntary psychiatric beds in Victoria (and elsewhere) is histor-
ically low?57 Is it a coincidence that supported decision-making 
was introduced at the same time as the increased emphasis on 
carer participation in the Mental Health Act? To what extent is 
supported decision-making part of a minimalist mental health 
architecture ‘offloading care’? What questions do we not ask 
when discussing agency and preferences and individual rights?
This last question finds echoes in recent work on the complex 
relations between care and coercion.58 As Hennion and Vidal-
Naquet59 point out, ‘constraint’ to date has generally been seen 
as a ‘necessary evil’ in discussions of mental healthcare, but 
what if, more radically, constraint is part of good care? What 
if, as Justin and Dorothy suggest, none of us know exactly what 
we want? Our preferences change, contradict each other, are 
co-constituted by (and resist) discourses and embodied others, 
are enacted in ‘caring assemblages’60? Then perhaps providing 
“assessment and treatment (…) in the least intrusive and restric-
tive way” is not always consistent with good care.61 It might 
rather, as we saw in our narratives, be experienced as a failure to 
care. Or even, for participants such as Amelia, with her narrative 
of perpetrators and victims, as a violent omission.
Likewise, we saw traces of resistance in our narratives. For 
example in the accounts of carers who threatened to “change 
the locks” or who told mental health services they could “have it 
all,” who were irresponsible as “a point of intervention.”62 These 
are practices whose dynamics are only hinted at within the limits 
of narrative. We hope that future research might from the outset 
employ plural methodologies that better capture how ‘care talk’ 
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correlates with ‘care practice’, drawing perhaps on the ethno-
graphic work of Mol,63 Pols,64 and Hennion and Vidal-Naquet,65 
or on the thoroughly interdisciplinary and entangled projects 
filtering into the critical medical humanities.66 For now, we hope 
this paper will contribute to a broadening of the ambit, a diver-
sification of what counts in examinations of care and coercion.
Finally then, this paper is not a call for supported deci-
sion-making projects to be dismantled, or for a return to the 
‘good old days’ of paternalism and psychiatric force. Rather it 
aspires to Latour’s idea of ‘critique as a form of disruptive rebel-
lion’,67 to a reimagining of the complex relations of care and 
coercion in contemporary mental healthcare, and to a seeing, 
feeling and connecting of the unexpected valences in supposedly 
empty gaps and omissions.
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